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THE PHILOSOPHY OF GEORGE SANTAYANA* 
G EORGE SANTAYANA was not only a philosopher. He was also a poet. I t  is not surprising, therefore, that his 
philosophy reflects a poet's mind. He thought little of aca- 
demic polemics. To him philosophy was an imaginative effort 
of the mind to grasp and to express in fitting language the 
prominent features of experience. He believed that the inter- 
est in reflection is essentially moral; its goal is to gain wisdom 
and to discover the good life. In aiming at these objectives 
Santayana wrote in the tradition of the great sages of man- 
kind, and it is as such that he may count for posterity. 
Born in Madrid in 1863 of Spanish parents, Santayana 
came to Boston at the age of nine, to be educated with the 
three chiIdren of his mother by previous marriage. Although 
reared in American schools, Santayana did not develop a 
sense of belonging to his environment. But, as he himself 
said, his detachment from America was balanced by an equal 
detachment from every other place. Although he occasion- 
ally went to Spain to visit his father, he  found the society 
and the public life of that country most unattractive. His 
later residences in England and in Italy were more satisfying, 
but the feeling of being a stranger, wherever he was, never 
left Santayana. And this, as he confessed, was rather con- 
sonant with his philosophy and may have helped to foim it.* 
Nevertheless, Santayana is an American philosopher. He 
obtained his philosophical training at Harvard under Wil- 
liam James and Josiah Royce, and taught there for over 20 
years. He wrote in English in a beautifully polished style, 
and regarded it as the only possible medium for him. On the 
" A public lecture delivered at the Rice Institute on November 28, 
1954. 
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eve of the First World War he received an inheritance from 
his mother's estate. This prompted him to give up his profes- 
sorship at Halvard and to move to Europe. He lived and 
wrote for a number of years in England, and later established 
his headquarters in Rome. During the Second World War, 
his health failing, he gave himself over to the care of nuns 
in an Italian convent and died there in September of 1952, 
working and writing we11 into his 90th year. 
Although a stranger everywhere, Santayana did not disa- 
vow his intellectual dependence on the American environ- 
ment. To this his own statement testifies: "My intellectual 
relations and labors still unite me closely to America; and it 
is as an American writer that I must count, if I am counted 
at all."3 He had no direct interest in and no acquaintance 
with the broader strata of American life, yet his writings 
reveal a sympathetic observer, often exhibiting a deep under- 
standing of American character. The following excerpt from 
the Character and Opinion in the United States, written in 
England in 1921, may serve as a good example. 
In his affection the American is seldom passionate, often 
deep, and always kindly. If it were given me to look into 
the depths of a man's heart, and I did not find goodwill at  
the bottom, I should say without any hesitation, You are 
not an American. But as the American is an individualist 
his goodwill is not officious. His instinct is to think well of 
everybody, and to wish everybody well, but in a spirit of 
rough comradeship, expecting every man to stand on his own 
legs and to be helpful in his turn. When he has given his 
neighbor a chance he thinks he has done enough for him; 
but he feels it is an absolute duty to do that. It will take some 
hammering to drive a coddling socialism into America.3 
Later on in the same book we find another shrewd remark 
about the American man, 
He  is an idealist working on matter. Understanding as he 
does the material potentialities of things, he is successful 
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in invention, conservative in reform, and quick in emergen- 
cies, All his life he jumps into the train after it has started 
and jumps out before it has stopped; and he never once gets 
left behind, or breaks a leg.4 
To the very last Santayana believed in the native goodness 
of the American. When in his latest work, Dominations and 
Powers, he proposed a new type of world government by 
experts he suggested that the leadership should be placed in 
the hands of Americans, since they are basically good and the 
most generous of all peoples. He also claimed that his Ameri- 
- - 
can friends were "more numerous, more loyal, more sympa- 
thetic, and with two or three exceptions, more beloved," than 
his friends of other nationalities. The people with whom he 
felt most at ease were Americans, and he found American 
tastes and manners more natural to him than any  other^.^ 
Santayana's social and political detachment has its counter- 
part in his refusal to identify himself with any philosophical 
school or movement. He stood aloof b o d  from the contempo- 
rary world of action and from the world of thought. He found 
both very uncongenial to his taste. This reaction is explained 
in one of his postl~umous writings. 
The liberal, empirical, psychological philosophy into which 
I was plunged was miserably artificial, like a modern town 
laid out in squares. There was nothing subterranean acknowl- 
edged in it, no ultimate catastrophe, no jungIe, no desert, 
and no laughter of the Gods. Mankind lived lost in the fog 
of self-consciousness, persuaded that it was creating itself 
and the whole universe. They had forgotten their religion; 
and their pliilosophy, when they had one, was a glorification 
of their vanity, and of their furious impulse to make money, 
to make machines, to make war. What would come of it, ex- 
cept perhaps to make them all alike? In my solitude I 
watched their mechanical arts not without admiration: they 
were clever children making their own toys, and as busy at it 
as birds building their nests or worms burrowing their holes. 
Verily they have their reward, if they enjoy the process. But 
may they not be rather multiplying their troubles, and missing 
the natural pleasures and dignity of man? These pleasures 
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and dignity lie in seeing and thinking, in living with an 
understanding of the place and destiny of We.6 
Santayana's philosophy cannot be fitted into a specific 
major camp. He found most philosopliical systems "anthro- 
pocentric and inspired by the conceited notion that man, or 
human reason, or the human distinction between good and 
evil is the centre and pivot of the universe."' He rejected 
idealism, pragmatism, and postivism-the three major camps 
of philosophical thinking in his lifetime-because he found 
them permeated with false pretensions and advocating false 
hopes. He believed them to be not only cognitively inade- 
quate, but also morally wrong. In rejecting the special 
schools of philosophy, each of which, according to Santayana 
"squints and overlooks half the facts and half the difficulties 
in its eagerness to find in some detail the key to the ~ h o l e , " ~  
he claimed to seek refuge in certain basic and persistent de- 
liverances of common sense, which, he believed, when well 
expressed, could become a better witness to the kind of 
world in which man finds himself. Santayana was fond of 
calling himself a naturalist, a realist, and a materialist. These 
labels certainly have an application to his philosophy, but not 
without some important qualifications. 
I 
One of the dominant themes in Santayana's thinking is 
scepticism. He was puzzled by the confidence with which 
men tended to identify their picture or their idea of the 
world with the world itself. Of course the primary and in- 
delible conviction of common sense teIls man that he is 
immersed in something which he calIs a world, full of things 
and events. But whence comes the claim that the world 
which confronts man is characterized properly by the qua& 
ties and distinctions which he happens to experience in it? 
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In his hasty judgment about the real nature of the world man 
tends to forget that the world as he knows it is a world seen 
only from his perspective. He forgets that his special animal 
equipment is the intervening variable which stands between 
him and what surrounds him. This variable is bound to dis- 
tort the world by presenting it to him in his own image. In 
spite of our progress in science we are still plagued with 
anthropocentric delusions. We project our representation of 
the world on the world itself, we read our concern about our 
limited destiny into the operation of the cosmos which, for 
all we know, is indifferent to our fate. 
Especially deluded is the claim of the idealists, culrninat- 
ing in the HegeIian philosophy, that the universe is directed 
by all-embracing rational laws, thus organizing and inter- 
locking all there is into one interdependent system, progres- 
sively unfolding its sublime destiny. How can such a wild 
claim be justified? Does it have any basis in fact? None what- 
ever, is Santayana's answer. We are not equipped with an 
instrument which could give us such knowledge. What we 
call reason is only a way in which the human animal adapts 
itself to its immediate environment. This adaptation does not 
exceed the narrow limits of natural needs and drives. If we 
are honest with ourselves we should confess to a vague but 
persistent awareness of a dark background which we cannot 
penetrate. The world is not what we find in it, and it is pre- 
sumptuous to claim that we know its core. The ultimate re- 
ality is unknowable in the same sense that a drum is inaudible; 
you can hear the sound but not the drum. An idealist who 
cIaims to know what the ultimate reality is, walks through 
one world while mentally beholding another. But what he 
is beholding isn't there. There is something, but what it is the 
humar~ being, as a biased creature, cannot know. 
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Our special human bias is involved in all knowledge. Take 
ordinary perception. The fundamental fact about perception 
is that it is a recognition of something absent. Seeing an 
object or a person is not merely seeing its immediate surface. 
When I look at a certain shape of a certain color and call it 
an apple, the meaning of the word "apple" is not encom- 
passed by the qualities which I perceive when I look at it. 
What I do not see are other qualities and properties which 
at the moment I do not perceive but nevertheless ascribe to 
the apple-such properties as weight, taste, solidity, etc, But 
how do I know that they are really present in that which 
I see? By animal faith, answers Santayana. Even ordinary 
everyday perception is full of memoly and expectation; it is 
a way of seeing what isn't there. But from this we can derive 
an important lesson: our contact with the world is primarily 
imaginative. The world becomes significant because we sup. 
plement in imagination what we see by what we do not see. 
What we see or are otherwise aware of are the immediate 
reports of the senses. What we add are the associated or 
expected features which are-and this is important-of some 
- 
possible interest to us. This is the way our experience be- 
comes meaningful, and a mere welter of sensations becomes 
for us a world. 
Merely to stare at a datum is to discover nothing but the 
datum itself. If I look at a red patch on the table and repress 
all memory and expectation I do not perceive anything at 
all. But if I let my animal psyche pursue its accustomed 
course, the sight of the red round patch will cause an im- 
pulse to connect it with further possible experiences which I 
have undergone in the past and which are recorded in 
memory. Memory itself Santayana defines as ''faith in the 
absentqwS The forward tension of this memory will cause an 
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expectation that similar experiences of formerly experienced 
properties await me in the future. This expectation is a 
strain of life in me, an animal faith, stretching my attention 
over what is not given but is of possible interest. Conse- 
quently, Santayana concludes that knowledge is only a more 
or less successful adjustment of an animal in its special way 
to its special environment. "Belief in the existence of any- 
thing, including myself, is radically incapable of proof, and 
resting, like all belief, on some irrational persuasion or 
prompting of life."'" 
These promptings of life may be more or less dependable 
and disciplined, but they will always make use of imagina- 
tion. The work of imagination consists in ballasting our sense 
data with that which they are taken to signify. Thus, if see- 
ing what is not there is madness, even ordinary perception is 
mad. But it may be nonnal madness, if imagination em- 
ployed is successful enough, if it establishes a harmony be- 
tween the flux in the organism and in its environment. The 
order of perceptions, checked against those of other people, 
may even establish a certain pattern of sanity, and this nor- 
malcy in the use of imagination will become a common sense 
picture of the world. But we should use it without being 
misled by it. An agreement of perceptions on a working basis 
is merely a projection of the world on the human scale, and 
we can understand it in terms of our purposes only. We have 
no knowledge of what the world is in itself, for all our knowl- 
edge is calling names on provocation. An animal equipped 
with a different visual apparatus will not see the fo~ms of 
things as they present themselves to a human eye, We know, 
for example, that for most animals colors do not exist, Simi- 
larly, the distribution of heavenly bodies on a stany sky will 
look quite differently from another planet, not to speak of 
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more remote corners of the intrastellar space. The game of 
picking out the Big Dipper would be played difFerently on 
Mars or on Venus, or more likely, it would not be played at 
all. Our relative perspective, our means of perception, and 
our special interests color every assertion we may make 
about the world. There is a real world, but it is not the one 
we construct out of our sense data and by our animal imagi- 
nation. The recognition of this truth should prevent us from 
lapsing into unwarranted dogmatic claims about the ultimate 
reality. All knowledge is recognition of something absent; it 
is, in Santayana's words, a salutation, not an embrace. 
One of the persistent and urgent deliverances of common 
sense is the belief in being rooted in that primeval, mysteri- 
ous, vital, prolific and irrational basis of all existence, which 
we call nature. This basic element out of which human life 
arises, which it confronts in itself and outside of itself, against 
which it has to fight and in which it finds its protection, 
Santayana calls matter or substance. "The realm of matter is 
the matrix and the source of everything; it is nature, the 
sphere of genesis, the universal mother."ll Santayana even 
suggested that this source of all being may be called God, if 
we prefer to call it so.'' Nevertheless, this source is nothing 
supernatural or otl~erworldly. I t  is definitely this world in all 
its infinite manifestations. "If in clinging to the immaterial 
we denied the material, it would not be merely ashes and 
dust that we should be despising, but all natural existence in 
its abysmal past and in its indefinite fertility; and it would 
be, not some philosopher's sorry notion that we should be 
denying, but the reality of our animal being, the fact that 
we are creatures of time, rooted in a moving universe in 
which our days are n~mbered."'~ 
Santayana's main objection to so many traditional philoso- 
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phies is that they were trying to deny this natural rootedness 
of man in the realm of matter, and even denied its very ex- 
istence. Human organism is but one form in which the in- 
finitely plastic matter expresses itself. That it does so, is 
nothing to be explained or investigated, for all existence is 
irrational in its very core. Why the world exists, or why it  is 
the kind of world it is and produces the beings it does, are 
unanswerable questions. Recognition of material facts as 
such is the beginning of wisdom. But there can be no ex- 
planation of any existence, Santayana tells us. "We may 
enjoy it, we may enact it, but we cannot conceive it; not 
because our intellect by accident is inadequate, but because 
existence, which substance makes continuous, is intrinsically 
a surd, a flux, a contradiction."14 
Since our contacts with matter are various, our ideas of 
it will be various. Furthermore, they will be always in some 
ways inadequate and provisional, for matter is essentially dy- 
namic and not pictorial. I t  is interesting to note in this con- 
nection that the view of modern physics that what we call 
matter can be best described in a formula defining certain 
dynamic relationships, is in line with Santayana's opinion. 
We should not forget, he tells us, that the common sense con- 
ventional ideas as well as more elaborate representations of 
science present us with a store of beliefs useful for om pur- 
poses, but that these beliefs by no means reflect the nature 
of the world itself. Without some beliefs we simply cannot 
do, and a rational attitude will consist in recognizing them as 
such "can't helps." But we should be mistaken and probably 
sooner or Iater disillusioned if we should take them for the 
whole of truth and not relative to our organisms and interests 
only. A human organism finds itself equipped with definite 
impulses and needs, and all its perceptions and organization 
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revolves around serving them well. This is the function of 
intelligence. Our comprel~ension of the existing world is use- 
ful in the same way that a sewer system is; it's good to have 
in order to make our lives more comfortable, but it would be 
a mistake to treat it as the pivot of the universe. A wise man 
will believe in a common sense world but will not take it too 
seriously. To find happiness and satisfaction he will turn 
somewhere else. 
Let us follow Santayana's invitation to visit further realms 
of being. But before we do so, it may be helpful to recapitu- 
Iate briefly the basis from which he proceeds. He wants to 
arm us with scepticism radical enough to rebuke all dog- 
matic philosophers and scientists who claim to show us the 
world as it really is. He appeals to the irresistible conviction 
of common sense that there exists an external order of things 
in which we are rooted and which we call nature, substance 
or matter. He reminds us that, although in dealing with our 
natural environment we organize our perceptions and cogni- 
tions to form beliefs about the world, those beliefs are not 
more than a basic orthodoxy of mankind. They are useful 
because they enable us to take care of our natural needs, but 
they do not bring us in contact with ultimate reality. Since a 
certain harmony and health of the organism is prerequisite to 
attaining a possible human good, we should value our biased 
knowledge for what haimony it can bring about. 
The natural adjustment and haimony characteristic of 
lower forms of life are attained without consciousness and 
intelligence. But a human organism, by virtue of its complex 
vital organs is capable of attaining satisfactions not open to 
the lower levels. It is in consciousness, in the mental life of 
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the human animal, that we discover a new realm, This realm 
Santayana calls the realm of essence. 
Santayana's concept of essence has been very troublesome 
to his readers. I t  has been widely discussed and criticized, 
often producing much heat and little conviction. Neverthe- 
less, this concept has had many versions in recent philosophy, 
which indicates that it may be one of the more significant 
ideas of our time. I t  has been given different names-"phe- 
nomenon" by Husserl, "eternal object" by Whitehead-but 
on .the whole it is used to define the same unique aspect of 
experience. Let us examine Santayana's version of this con- 
cept. For him it is one of the most important philosophical 
insights, even though he himself once suggested a possibility 
that his doctrine of essence may be "merely a monk's dream."'" 
We have already noted that any existence is for Santayana 
an object of faith. Knowledge of things is knowledge of 
something not directly given but postulated by animal faith. 
The existence of the apple which we considered a while ago 
is a belief mediated by a symbol of which we are directly 
aware: a red round patch. Suppose we refrain from positing 
the existence of any further qualities that this red patch 
usually signalizes. This we can do by suspending our refer- 
ential attitude, which, Santayana told us, is the pressure of 
the animal psyche in us, storing up certain memories and 
stretching certain expectations into the future. In suspending 
this belief and arresting our present experience, what are we 
aware of? Nothing but the round red patch. Now extend 
this suspension of belief to all objects signalized by sense- 
data, and confine yourselves to that which is immediately 
given. In looking around the room suppress all the memories 
and expectations connected with what you see, that is, es- 
clude everything you do not see, such as the other side of the 
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walls, the insides of solid objects, the histories of the faces 
you are looking at. This is not easy to do because our aware- 
ness of present experiences is so automatically permeated by 
those brought in from the past or possible future that we 
hardly ever or never pay attention to what is really given to 
us immediately. But if you succeeded in removing the ballast 
of all memory and expectation, what wouId remain? Essences, 
suggests Santayana. 
Essence is appearance taken as appearance, with no refer- 
ential object tied to it. Essences are nothing but surfaces as 
surfaces. Whenever we add that they are surfaces of some- 
thing, we are already transcending what we actually are 
aware of. When you suspend all belief in objects behind 
appearance you discover a new inhi te  realm of essences. 
This realm is inexhaustible, claims Santayana, and it is be- 
cause of our particular animal constitution that we come in 
contact only with some of them. Moreover, only a limited 
portion of possible essences finds existential embodiment. 
Here Santayana reaffirms the protean, arbitrary power of 
matter to determine on its own which essences to embody. 
For all we know there may be other universes where quite 
different essences may be given existence in objects. And 
there may be essences in our immediate surrounding which 
never have been intuited. One might say that the impression- 
istic school in painting, the modern non-representational art, 
and atonal music are examples of a search for new essences. 
Perhaps James Joyce's and Gertrude Stein's linguistic exer- 
cises were attempts to capture directly intimate surfaces of 
experience which are not conveyed in conventional language. 
When the Camel or Chesterfield advertisers describe the ab- 
solutely unique ffavors of their products, they show that the 
interest in essences is indeed a common feature of dailv ex- 
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perience. Gourmets and wine connoisseurs, not to speak of 
opium and marijuana smokers, are all in their ways believers 
in Santayana's doctrine of essence. 
It is important to stress the absolute abundance of es- 
sences. They are not limited to the sense-data. The surface 
aspect of any experience is an essence, and this includes all 
complex relations. Although pink elephants and green rats, 
as we say, do not exist, their essences can be distinguished. 
Even such characters as mathematical and scientific formu- 
las have their essences, although they can be intuited only by 
those who understand them. But of course, the most abun- 
dant field of essences is art. I t  is there that the awareness of 
essences is intensified and brought to a sharp focus. 
In saying this, we have put our hands on the central lever 
of Santayanays philosophy. He found the characteristic capac- 
ity of the human animal in its ability to enjoy essences as 
separated from their embodiment in existence. The existence 
and the real nature of things is to us a closed book. We  
should reconcile ourselves to our limited grasp of the nature 
of the material flux in which we are embedded as natural 
beings, since this flux at bottom is arbitrary and irrational. 
This being our true situation, how shall we face it? Control 
matter as much as you can, says Santayana, adjust your phys- 
ical well-being to the rest of nature, but don't get too excited 
about the material aspect of existence. This is the main fault 
of unqualified materialists and positivists. A wise man will 
try to live in health and physical comfort, but he will lay up  
his treasures somewhere else. 
By way of essences we can now enter what Santayana 
calls the re& of spirit. On the face of it, it seems extremely 
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puzzling for a materialist to admit that there is such a realm. 
However, an examination of the nature of this realm may 
show what meaning Santayana assigns to the idea of spirit 
and how this idea fits into his system. 
To understand what spirit means it is necessary to make 
a distinction between essence and i.lztuition of essence. In 
any direct apprehension of essence, what we are aware of is 
different from the act of apprehending it. Now the acts of 
apprehending essences is the life of spirit. In  a word, life of 
spirit is consciousness. It  is the total inner difference between 
being awake and being asleep, alive or dead. Spirit is con- 
sciousness of experience as consciously enjoyed; it is atten- 
tion, feeling, tl~ought. The realm of spirit is the realm of all 
value. But we must guard ourselves from the delusion of 
regarding spirit as something independent and in some way 
exercising its own power and authority. I t  is explicitly a 
surface fullction of a natural organism which has reached a 
certain high level of con~plexity and organization. I t  has no 
independence of matter, but on the contrary, constitutes one 
of its dimensions, supervening on the natural basis. I t  is "a 
1:atural faculty in a natural soul,"16 for "spirit would have 
notlling to live with and nothing to live for, if it had begun 
and ended being a spirit."17 
Spirit for Santayana is the moral fruition of physical life. 
It is epiphenomenal, volatile and evanescent, crowning some 
natural impulse as it attains its fulfilment. I t  is an inner light 
which, although powerless, renders events in experience 
mentally present. The function of spirit, which is essentially 
imaginative and poetical, can itself be best expressed through 
metaphor. Santayana calls it "the witness of the cosmic 
dance,"ls a "product of combustion," a 'leaping flame,"'" 
which is "blown and extinguished by any wind: but no ex- 
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tinction here can prevent it from blazing up there, and its 
resurrection is as perpetual as its death."20 
At the same time, spirit is a "fountain and seat of judg- 
ment,7'21 it is "an ideal possession of things materially ab- 
sent."" This function, which we call 'mind," liberates man 
from his blind immersion in material processes by observing, 
conceiving, enjoying, asserting, desiring, at the same time 
being capable of renouncing and outlasting any particular 
interest or ~ommitment.'~ This cumulative response to ex- 
perience gives substance and richness to the life of spirit; it 
endows humanity with culture. But it has no other destiny 
than to be privately enjoyed. Spirit is ever on the wing, has 
nothing to do with death or another life; it may come at any 
moment and it totally vanishes as it lives. It is immaterial, 
neither a drain nor an inffuence, and merely a concomitant 
to natural life.24 On one occasion Santayana was quoted as 
saying that consciousness is "a sort of nodding towards or 
throwing kisses at reality or off into vacancy."" Out of the 
welter of intermittent and conflicting impressions the human 
psyche tries to construct as much order and beauty as it can, 
and hold them together in intuition and understanding. It 
craves to rescue its world from confusio~l "so that it may be 
better seen and understo~d."~~ This is the value of reflective 
and imaginative life of which man is capable: to form a 
single drama out of conflicting impressions and impulses, 
"The better we know the world the more inescapable will be 
our perception of its tragic and comic character, that is to 
say, of its vanity as an experience and of its richness as truth. 
We see tllat the only profit in experience is its profit for the 
~pirit.'"~ 
According to Santayana man is half-animal and half-poet. 
To experience happiness, to be aware of goodness he must 
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use the latter function. Nature in its innumerable pre-human 
forms may achieve equilibrium, habitual forms of behavior, 
smooth adjustment of functions, but prior to attaining the 
light of consciousness it knows no goodness and no happi- 
ness. Actual happenings in themselves are blind; to be en- 
joyed they must be illumined by spirit. "Intuition though it 
always has a natural ground never can have a natural object, 
but onIy an ideal one. Nature has learned to know itself at 
this price, that its knowledge should be indirect and sym- 
bolic, It can describe itself only in words, and had to invent 
them in order to think."" But when the light of spirit is 
kindled in the natural man, the valves towards value are 
open. Healthy and smooth discharge of organic functions 
will reflect itself in a sense of welconle and joy. "All ideals are 
but projections of vital tendencies in animal  organism^,"^^ 
and spirit is only a silent observation of these tendencies as 
they engage in constant play. The awareness of the passing 
scene through intuitions of essences will intermittently kindle 
delight, suffering, joy, pain and pleasure. The fullest and 
most innocent absorption in intuition of essences is found in 
the play of children. As he lives and gains experience, man 
will learn how to discriminate between things which are 
good for their own sake and those which are mere instru- 
mentalities. Furthermore, he will reject and condemn the 
intuitions which bring distraction to spirit. Such distraction 
is seen pure in pain. "As an intuition, if such it may be 
called, pain is empty, yet as a sensation it is intense, arrest- 
ing, imperative; so that it exemplifies the veiy essence of evil 
for the spirit to exist in vain, to care intensely in the dark, 
to be prodded into madness about But those 
essences which a man will find attractive, beautiful and good 
in themselves, are the crown and fruition of living. 
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Spirit, the most derivative aspect of natural life, by open- 
ing through intuition and imagination the avenues to con- 
summatory experiences, constitutes the most valuable aspect. 
The world must be enjoyed for what it is and for what it 
offers to the life of spirit. Santayana's message to every 
human being is therefore: be a poet in some way. A social 
and gregarious animal Iike man will naturally find much 
goodness in the communal aspect of his existence. Our 
awareness of each other, mutual involvement and depend- 
ence, furnish a propitious medium for the activity of spirit. 
"Social life lifts the spirit to a more comprehensive intelli- 
gence; there is more constant transcendence of the self in 
imagination and a richer, more varied, more dramatic world 
to imagine and to overcome."31 Our daily work, if enlight- 
ened, can be another source of spiritual freedom and enjoy- 
ment. To love one's work is to attain this possible perfection. 
For, as Santayana tells us, "Free labor and art is simply 
nature unravelling its potentialities, both in the world and 
in the mind, unravelling them together, in so far as they are 
harmonious in the two  sphere^."^' Interest in art engages 
consciousness in the contemplation of possible beauty, for 
'<art in general is a rehearsal of rational living, and recasts in 
idea a world which we have no present means of recasting in 
reality."3s Any society in which people are compelled to do 
what they do not wish to do, or are forced to put up with 
what does not content them, is defeating and frustrating the 
life of spirit. 
Spirit has other enemies besides human ignorance. Too 
often brute matter, the indifferent and arbitrary course of 
nature, defeats spirit and denies it its possible happiness. 
Being powerless, spirit cannot command its terms to the 
world. The dangers of existence cannot be eliminated, but 
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the struggle to  survive is not without value to the life of 
spirit. Although mortal dangers are always with us, there is a 
way to deal with them: "in raising them into conscious suf- 
fering and love, spirit turns the ignominy of blind existence 
into nobleness, setting before us some object to suffer for and 
to pursue. In the very act of becoming painful, life has be- 
come worth living in its own eyes."34 A wise man will not 
bash his head against the wall. To be disillusioned is a con- 
sequence of living in a world whose ultimate core remains 
unencompassed and dark. Man always was and will be sur- 
rounded and ambushed by the impenetrable powers of 
matter. But when he sees illusion as an illusion, it ceases to 
be illusory. I t  is possible for man to be disillusioned without 
becoming sour, disenchanted without being embittered. 
Toward whom shall we bear malice, and to whom shall we 
express our disappointment? Nature bears us no malice, and 
in lending its premises to the activity of spirit, cannot be 
accused of enmity to it. Only we must not expect too much. 
The last step in wisdom is to renounce the striving to possess 
and to change the world; the dominion of spirit is ideal, it is 
intellectual worship, pure vision, and pure love, it is the 
capacity to identify oneself with "the truth and beauty that 
rise unbidden from the world into the realm of ~pirit."~" 
"There can be no final victory in existence, except in the 
comment that spirit may make on it."36 
Santayana's philosophy is too rich in content to be dis- 
cussed in a few pages. Moreover, it cannot be summarily 
criticized for being true or false, right or wrong. Santayana 
does not argue his views. He presents them as a possible way 
of looking at things, believing that his readers may find in 
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their own experience much of what he sought to express in 
his writings. No doubt a sympathetic reader will find this to 
be the case. 
There is a definite merit in Santayana's urgent reminders 
that we are too eager to identify our representations of things 
with the nature of reality itself. Philosophers always have 
been tempted to identify what is most important for man 
with what is most real in the universe. In this respect San- 
tayana's sceptical voice is a refreshing wind. He asked us to 
give due recognition to our special animal bias in our theo- 
retical and practical comprehension of the ways of the uni- 
verse. In agreement with common sense convictions, he 
pointed to the primacy of the immediate immersion of man 
in the totality of things which overwhelms him in its vast- 
ness and impenetrability. He believed that this feeling of 
immersion in nature is basically sound and reflects the true 
nature of our situation. To a healthy human animal theoriz- 
ing is always artificial, suspect and secondary, while instinct 
and feeling are congenial, primordial and primary. In the 
recognition of the natural basis of existence Santayana's voice 
was not alone. The primacy of fact over idea is characteristic 
of our century. The naturalistic trend has a powerful ally in 
the contemporary reliance on experimental, pragmatic, posi- 
tivistic methods and procedures in science. In the study of 
man himself, behavioristic psychology and descriptive social 
sciences are emphasizing the factual conditions of man's 
existence, At the same time psychiatry and depth psychology 
probe the deeper strata of human nature. The quest for 
naturalistic ethics has been quite lively of late, and Santa- 
yana's version is only one among many, although, of course, 
distinguished by its advocacy of esthetic illumination in 
natural enjoyments. 
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What is more uniquely Santayana's contribution, is his 
contagious invitation to seek value in the realm of art and 
symbolic imagination. In inviting us to live in the presence 
of an ideal, to increase our awareness of the multiplicity of 
beautiful forms which a well-lived life can offer, to sharpen 
our intellectual comprehension of the world to the degree in 
which such comprehension is possible, Santayana was per- 
forming a great service, He asked of man not to be pre- 
occupied with the instrumentalities of living and not so 
- 
excited about the material aspect of existence. A wise man 
- 
will concentrate his attention and give his allegiance to those 
things to which everything else is but a means. It is not the 
number of cars and electrical appliances that makes our lives 
better, but the amount of beauty and goodness which they 
may help inject into our experience. 
The object of Santayana's philosophy was the enlighten- 
ment of men in the sphere of values. Like the Greeks, of 
whom he was very fond, Santayana urged us to ask ourselves 
whether what we pursue is really for our good. There are 
passages in his writings which reveal a genuine and profound 
appreciation of the intrinsic goodness of life. It is difficult to 
resist the temptation to quote some of the finer flights of 
Santayana's spirit. They seem to contradict his contention 
that this spirit was really vanishing as it lived. 
Spirit has its lyric triumphs in childhood and in the simple 
life: wedding days and moonlight nights and victories in war 
and soft music and pious tiust. I t  breaks out momentarily in 
the shabbiest surroundings, in laughter, understanding, and 
small surrenders of folly to reason. Such moments are far 
from permanently lifting the soul they visit into a high 
spiritual sphere; often they come to ne'er-do-wells, poets, 
actors, or rakes, The spark dies in the burnt paper; yet it 
had the quality of a flame or a star. All the saint or the sage 
can add is constancy to that light, so that it colours all their 
thoughts and actions, turning the material circumstances into 
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almost indifferent occasions. Yet the least disciplined or in- 
tegrated of us sometimes feel something within us rising 
above ourselves, a culmination, a release, a transport beyond 
distraction. I t  was but a summer lightning, and the sultriness 
continues unabated; yet the flash has given us a taste of 
liberty.S7 
No doubt the spirit or energy of the world is what is acting 
in us, as the sea is what rises in every little wave; but it 
passes through us, and cry out as we may, it will move on. 
Our privilege is to have perceived it as it moves. Our dignity 
is not in what we do, but in what we understand. The whole 
world is doing things. We are turning in that vortex; yet 
within us is silent observation, which bridges the distances 
and compares the combatants.38 
In the earlier stage of his philosophical development San- 
tayana's thought was more cheerful and even sang praises to 
the immortality of human reason. Of course, the eternity of 
which he speaks cannot exist except in a vision of time, for 
otherwise "eternity would have no meaning for men in the 
world, while the world, men and time would have no status 
in e terni t~ ."~Vhe r al substance of all existence is material 
and perishable, and the eternal aspect is derivative from it. 
"If time bred nothing, etesnity wo111d have nothing to em- 
balm."" However, the vision of the intellect is imperishable, 
"because it is ideal and resident merely in import and 
intent ."41 
Experience is essentially temporal and life foredoomed to be 
mortal, since its basis is a process and an opposition; it 
floats in the stream of time, never to return, never to be 
recovered and repossessed. But ever since substance became 
at some sensitive point intelligent and reflective, ever since 
time made room and pause for memory, for history, for the 
consciousness of time, a god, as it were, became incarnate in 
mortality and some vision of truth, some self-forgetful satis- 
faction, became a heritage that moment could transmit to 
moment and man to man. , . 
As Archimedes, measuring the hypothenuse, was lost to 
events, so art and science interrupt the sense for change by 
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engrossing attention in its issues and its laws. . . Uncon- 
sciousness of temporal conditions and of the very flight of 
time make the thinker sink for a moment into identity with 
timeless objects. And so immortaIity, in a second ideal sense, 
touches the mindsq" 
Nevertheless, for all its poetic beauty, there is a deeply 
disturbing note in what Santayana conceives to be the life of 
spirit. This disturbing note rings in the outright assertion of 
the evanescence and essential futility of human destiny. I t  is 
hard to accept Santayana's analysis of life as a series of little 
victories on the road to ultimate defeat. Moreover, this analy- 
sis carries with it a cognitive claim which our experiences do 
not seem to bear out. Santayana's central doctrine-the sep- 
aration of essence from existence and the consequent char- 
acterization of spiritual life as esthetic communion with non- 
existing, non-efficacious, powerless essences-is a groundless 
doctrine and rests on distorted evidence. He describes the 
enjoyment of essences as the pursuit of ideals. But this, as he 
himself at times admits, is a pursuit of futility. To believe in 
ideals that are plainly irrelevant to the actual course of our 
life and, apart from esthetic titillation, make no difference to 
it, is not only futile, but also often irresponsible. Essence 
is what an ideal becomes when it loses all vitality. 
The radical disillusionment of Santayana is really the 
result of his analysis of human ideals. If thought is indeed a 
surface function, then of course, futility is the only answer 
and we should exclaim with Ecclesiastes: All is vanity! This 
is where the unwarranted separation of essence from exist- 
ence, of contemplative and esthetic enjoyment from practical 
involvement in the affairs of living, does its real damage. If 
pressed to ultimate conclusion, it should lead not only to 
renunciation and to ivory tower living, but also to utter 
indifference, irresponsibility, and at best to an egoistic pur- 
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suit of Epicurean contentment. Santayana often speaks like 
his favorite poet Lucretius. "If you have seen the world, if 
you have played the game and won it, what more would you 
ask for? If you have tasted the sweets of existence, you 
should be satisfied; if the experience has been bitter, you 
should be glad it comes to an end.''43 
It is true enough that ideas by themselves have no physical 
efficacy. But it is equally true that human beings equipped 
with ideas do have such efficacy. At least their lives become 
different when they entertain their ideas seriously and guide 
their activity in accordance with them. In a sense, Santa- 
yana's disenchanted and wintry wisdom reflects our modern 
disillusionment in man's rational capacity and in his ability 
to shape the world for his own good. Undoubtedly, recent 
political and social upheavals furnish enough material for 
scepticism about man's use of his powers. Global wars and 
the threat of atomic annihilation show us how precarious our 
individual existence is and how little we can do to alter our 
personal fate. But this does not mean that all efforts to avert 
disaster on the part of thinking men are doomed to failure. 
Paradoxically enough, it is the ideas in some people's minds 
that really expose us to the atomic threats. Those ideas are a 
threat because they are accompanied by an effective grasp 
and control of nature's powers and resources. To a significant 
extent our fortunes depend on what kind of ideas and ideals 
we and our fellowmen shall embrace as our guides. Not only 
does our mutual survival or mutual destluction depend on 
the ideas we shall embody in our living, but also the very 
meaning of life will receive its import from the ideaIs we 
shall choose to follow. Our choices will have practical effects 
in our natural life. And it is because of its possible real effects 
that an idea is or is not worth embracing and following. For- 
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tunately, much of Santayana's moral wisdom stands firmly in 
spite of his gloomy estimate of human aspirations. The ideal 
of brotherhood and love, expressed by him in the essay on 
"Ultimate Religion,'" could hardly find a more effective state- 
ment. 
To love things spiritually, that is to say, intelligently and 
disinterestedly, means to love the love in them, to worship 
the good which they pursue, and to see them all propheti- 
cally in their possible beauty. To love things as they are 
would be a mockery of things: a true lover must love them as 
they would wish to be. For nothing is quite happy as it is, 
and the first act of true sympathy must be to move with the 
object of love toward its happiness.44 
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